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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the short run and long run effects of fiscal 
policy. The classical-Harrodian model developed in Moudud (2000, 1999), which is an 
extension of Shaikh (1995, 1992, 1991), provides a demonstration of dynamic fiscal 
policy context. It asserts that the there is a crowding in of output growth in the short run. 
In the long run, however, the impact of government spending is subject to change under 
some circumstances of capital utilization, normal profit rate and social savings rate.  
Blinder and Solow (1973), using IS-LM model, reveal that bond-financed fiscal 
expansion does not engender a complete crowding out. Friedman (1978, 1985) notices 
the possibility of crowding-in. Crowding-out or crowding-in debate can be extended to 
other economists. Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) reach 
crowding-in results. Bairam and Ward (1993) find crowding-out of private investment. 
Barro (1989, 1999) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) obtain either a negative or no 
effect of government spending on the growth, whereas the works of Argimon et al. 
(1997), Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ahmed and Miller (2000) have mixed results. 
This study runs VECM models and impulse response analysis to juxtapose the crowding 
in/out effects of fiscal policy. Investigating the short run and long-run implications of 
fiscal policy for the Turkish economy, this paper concludes that government 
investments crowd out, whereas its current expenditures crowd in the private 
investment. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, crowding-in, crowding-out, cointegration, VECM 
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I. Introduction: Theoretical perspectives 
The neoclassical model claims that an increase in government spending, with constant 
revenue, results in a decline in output and employment. This result is due to the 
neoclassical assumptions of full employment and full utilization of capacity. The model 
of neoclassic argues that increase in government spending, given that government 
revenue is fixed, brings about higher interest rates, thereby crowding out private 
investments. To be more specific, the result of increase in interest rate comes from the 
neoclassical loanable funds theory. In the theory, bond-financed government spending 
creates an insufficient fund for private investment. Since it is assumed that the supply of 
fund is fixed in the theory, the competition between government and private sector for 
the available fund gives rise to higher interest rates. As a result, (at least some of) 
private investors leave the loan market. 
However, in the short run, the IS-LM side of the neoclassical model suggests that there 
might be unemployment. By following standard IS-LM model, in the short run, deficit-
financed (bond-financed) government expenditure lets IS curve shift to right. Then 
output will go up together with the increase the demand for money. Both rightward shift 
in IS and increase in demand for money would imply a rise in interest rate and thus a 
fall in investment. This will cause output to fall. One should note that the new output 
level is still grater than the initial output before fiscal expansion, as long as LM has 
positive slope. Another way of saying is that the output is greater than the initial level 
but smaller than it would be otherwise. Of course, this is not end of the story. The 
portfolio effect of excessive supply of bonds would also imply a leftward shift in LM 
curve and therefore further increase in interest rates. In other words, since, in portfolio, 
the ratio of money to bond has decreased, LM curve has shifted to left. In order for 
households to keep this relatively lower money/bond ratio (M/B), interest rates need to 
be higher. One can put this way: When there is excessive supply of bonds (lower ratio 
of M/B), there occurs an excessive demand for money and then resulting outcome is a 
higher rate of interest rate. Then, what is the magnitude of crowding out? Obviously it 
depends on the income and interest sensitiveness of investment and demand for money. 
One can continue for IS-LM analysis to capture the stochastic results of bond financed-
deficit in the long run. After a short run implication of fiscal policy given above 
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paragraph, what happens in the next period? As long as government needs to issue new 
bonds because of repayment of earlier bonds supplied, there will be higher rate of 
interest at each period because of leftward shift of LM each period. This implies a fall in 
output every period. Combining all these each short-run fiscal expansions, at the end, 
one might reach complete crowding-out. Further, as an extreme case, the final 
consequence of initial impact of fiscal policy in the long run might be a collapsed output 
together with a complete crowding-out (CEPA, 2003).  
Following Blinder and Solow (1973), because of the wealth effects of bonds and 
money, initial (short run) and final (in the long run) consequences of fiscal policy do not 
yield a complete crowding-out. A fall in output causes unemployment and, therefore, a 
fall in wages and prices. Within this Pigou effect, even if government repeats the issue 
of bonds at each period, an increase in power of purchasing of households due to 
increase in bond and money in their portfolios, the consumption will be higher. This 
implies a shift in IS to the right. If rightward shift in IS (wealth effect) compensates 
leftward shift in LM (portfolio effect) at each period, then, a complete crowding-out 
would not occur. Blinder and Solow (1973) claim that in case of unemployment, the 
wealth effect is greater than the portfolio effect. Therefore the net output is going to be 
higher than initial level. This less than complete crowding-out (partial crowding-out) 
might also imply a partial crowding-in. 
Friedman (1978) also notices the possibility of crowding-in result. An extension of IS-
LM analysis with three assets of money, government bonds and real capital (equity), 
emphasizes the importance of relative substitutabilities of these assets. If the 
substitution degree between government bonds and money were greater than that of 
bonds and capital, crowding-in would occur. A good substitution of bonds for money 
results in a rightward shift in LM through portfolio effect. After bond financed-fiscal 
expansion, the ratio of bond plus money to capital (M+B)/K increases in households 
portfolio. This will cause the LM to sift to right. In this case the resulting income with 
portfolio effect (Y1p) is greater than both initial income (Yo) and the income produced 
by traditional IS-LM equation with money demand effect (Y1md). To be more specific; 
assume that government issues bonds to finance it s spending. First outcome is an 
increase in income (income effect of fiscal policy). The second outcome is an increase 
in demand for money, which is a function of income (money demand effect of income). 
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The money demand effect offsets a part of income effect (partial crowding-out). The 
third or concurrent outcome is an amended portfolio by households (portfolio effect). 
Under the assumption of a good substitutability of bond for money, the consequence of 
expansionary fiscal policy is Y1p Y1md Yo. 
Friedman (1978), on the other hand, indicates that, if bond is a good substitute for 
capital, then, a bond financed-deficit engenders a relative decline in portfolio of 
(M/(K+B) . In this case, LM curve shifts to leftward. This portfolio crowding-out 
effect together with money demand crowding-out effect may result in as (Y1p + Y1md )
Yo.   
In Friedman analysis (1978), however, the empirical evidence reaches the conclusion 
that the money and bonds are not perfect substitutes; hence crowding-in can occur.  
One may focus the relative returns of these assets in analyzing the potential different 
portfolio effects. In a portfolio crowding-out case, a bond financed-spending implies an 
increase the rates of return on bonds and capital (bonds and capital are substitutes). The 
portfolio crowding-in case, on the other hand, a bond financed-spending implies a fall in 
the rate of return on capital and a rise in return on bonds (bonds and capital are not 
substitutes). To be more specific, following Friedman (1985), one should underline two 
points. First, a supply of any asset raises that asset s expected return. Second, a supply 
of any asset may raise the expected return on other assets (they are substitute since they 
move together) or lower the expected return on other assets (they are not substitute since 
they do not move together).  
Friedman (1985) finds that a $100 billion additional supply of short-term debt lowers 
expected return on equity (capital) by 0.33 %, relative to the return on short-term debt. 
His study (1985) also concludes that a $100 billion additional supply of long-term debt 
lowers expected return on equity (capital) by 0.24 %, again relative to the return on 
short-term debt. Hence, the result in general is that bonds and equity are relatively poor 
substitutes. Together with these results, Friedman (1978, 1985) suggests that, although 
neither bonds and money nor bonds and capital (and nor short-term bonds and long-
term bonds) are perfect substitutes, a good debt management policy should be followed 
by considering the relative substitutability among assets. To this end, one can draw a 
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conclusion from Friedman works that long-term financing may bring about crowding-
out, whereas the short-term financing may cause crowding-in.  
The literature of substitutability of the assets is, of course, ambiguous. For instance, 
Aivazian et al. (1990) investigate whether non-money assets (i.e., bonds and equities) 
are substitutes or complements. Their empirical finding is that bonds and equities are 
substitutes. In this circumstance, bond-financed deficit make households switch from 
illiquid (bond and equity) to liquid (money). The potential consequence is a crowding-
out. 
In short so far, due to existence of unemployment in the short run of IS-LM model, an 
increase in government expenditure may have positive effect on output and 
employment. The Keynesian model, since the problems of unemployment and 
unutilized capacity are recurrent, predicts also that fiscal policy has positive/desired 
effects to adjust the cyclical growth. For both models, however, once economy reaches 
to full employment, fiscal policy is not effective.  
What about if economy is at full productive capacity? Then, one may derive the 
conclusion of ineffective fiscal policy no matter which model is considered. Moudud 
(1999), on the other hand, suggests that, even the existence of normal capacity 
utilization, which is defined as economically feasible capacity, the fiscal policy may 
yield a higher output. Any productive fiscal policy, i.e., government productive 
investments rather than its consumption, that lowers business costs or increase business-
retained earnings yields higher long-run growth. The model s results about efficiency of 
fiscal policy are basically based on social savings rate (i.e., share of business retained 
earnings when households savings are ignored) and the composition of government 
spending (consumption and infrastructure investments). A higher growth of output can 
be reached through higher social saving rate and a higher share of government 
infrastructure investment to government consumption.   
II. More tangible results of fiscal policy 
In searching the literature to analyze the link between output and fiscal policy, I would 
like to underline several papers, which deserve consideration, among many others cited 
intensively in the literature. This section presents the results of some calibrated and 
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regression models. The outcomes of some of these works either support crowding-in, or 
are in favor of the crowding-out result, whereas some others have mixed results.  
Barry and Devereux (2003) search, for instance, the possible outcome of a 
contractionary fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model. In their 
overlapping generations model, when it is calibrated, the government spending 
multiplier is negative and can be quantitatively significant. Therefore, the model 
predicts that a fiscal contraction is expansionary in terms of aggregate national income. 
When the government-spending ratio is 20%, long run government spending multiplier 
is approximately 0.45. In a dynamic framework, a unit cut in government spending 
increases the current consumption by less than unit cut in spending. This causes a fall in 
interest rate and an immediate rise in labor supply, hence an increase in investment and 
capital stock. As capital accumulation occurs from short term to the long term, output 
rises immediately in the very short run and gradually in the long run. The initial 
increase of output is, however, very small. Thus, the view that large spending cut 
creates an immediate boom in the real economy does not hold. The higher is the initial 
government-spending ratio, the higher the response of output by a fiscal contraction 
both in the short and in the long run.  
Moudud (2000), in his classical-Harrodian model, which is an extension of Shaikh 
(1992, 1995), and which dates back to Quesnay, Marx, Ricardo and Harrod, posits that 
growth and cycles are endogenous, underutilized capacity is recurrent and 
unemployment is persistent.  The model reveals that long-run growth of output depends 
on long run or normal rate of profit. This rate is determined by income distribution and 
technology as in Ricardo, Marx and Sraffa. An increase in profit margin (i.e., lower 
business costs due to investment tax credits, lower rates of corporate taxation and 
accelerated deductions for capital depreciation) will raise the growth. In the model, 
given the normal rate of profit, the key determinant is social savings rate (s*). It is 
defined as the private savings rate (business retained earnings plus households savings) 
less the budget deficit of government. The simulation exercises of the model indicate 
that a rise in government spending level (G) relative to Y, (g), leads crowding-in the 
short-run. If private savings rate is fixed, then, an increase in g leads crowding-out in 
the long run at normal capacity with structural unemployment. If s* increases with the 
increase in private savings rate, then, an increase in g result in crowding-in in the long 
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run. On the other hand, model also estimates the result of an increase in G rather than g. 
One-time increase in G yields crowding-in in the short run. In the long run, one-time 
increase in G does not engender crowding-out since g remains fixed. 
Barro (1990) employs also an endogenous growth model to investigate the effects of 
government expenditures on growth as in Moudud (2000). His model, of course, differs 
from Moudud s model with many perspectives but has the same emphasis on positive 
effect of productive government expenditures on growth as Moudud (1999, 2000). His 
growth analysis includes tax-financed government expenditures. According to the 
predictions of the model, the marginal (average) income tax, t, with a given the ratio of 
public services per person to the output per person (g/y), has a negative effect on growth 
and savings rates since t is associated with a negative effect on private investment after-
tax return. The share of productive government expenditures or the share of public 
services, g/y, effects growth and savings rates positively. These public services, such as 
police, fire protection and national defense that individuals receive, are proportional to 
the amount of individuals property. Improvement in property rights resembles 
reductions in marginal tax rates from the point of investors. An increase in g, which 
improves property rights, lowers the negative effect of t in effective value. Therefore, 
enhancement in property rights brings about higher growth and savings. Productive 
government expenditures therefore cause an increase in growth and savings in the short 
run, but a decline in the long run (i.e., due to increase in taxes through increase in 
output). An increase in share of nonproductive government expenditures or share of 
government consumption, h/y, for g/y given, leads to lower growth and savings rates. 
The reason is that an increase in h/y creates both productivity in private sector and 
higher income tax rate.  
Barro (1989, 1990) employs the data for the period over 1960 to 1985, which is 
modified version of Summers-Heston data (1988), to reveal the effects of government 
consumption as a share of output (gc/y), public investment as a share of total investment 
(gi/i) and public investment as a share of output (gi/y) on growth of per capita income. 
Using the data for 98 developed and developing countries, the parameter estimate of 
gc/y is 0.12 (s.e = 0.03). Thus non-productive government consumption yields lower 
growth. Employing the data for 76 countries, gi/i is estimated as 0.014 (s.e. = 0.022). 
Positive but insignificant coefficient indicates no relation between public investment 
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and growth, which in turn implies that government optimizes according to the theory. 
Finally, using the data for 76 countries, the coefficient of gi/y is again positive but 
insignificant with the values of 0.13 (s.e. = 0.10).  
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) follow a large data set of Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS), International Financial Statistics (IFS), Summer and Heston (1991), Barro and 
Wolf (1989), Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) and some other sources 
for the period 1970-1988 for 100 countries. Their cross sectional analysis reveals the 
significant evidence that the share of transport and communication has positive effect on 
growth, which ranges between 0.59 and 0.66 and that general government investment is 
also consistently positively correlated with both growth with the coefficient of 0.4 and 
private investment with the coefficient of close to 1. 
Argimon, Gonzales and Roldan (1997) reach the same result as Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993). They predict the effects of public investment and government consumption on 
private investment. Using a panel data for 14 developed OECD countries from 
Summers and Heston (1991), they present an existence of a crowding-in effect of 
private investment induced by public investment due to existence of positive impact of 
infrastructure on private investment productivity. In their findings, there also appears 
some evidence of crowding out of investment by government consumption. From this 
fact, they oppose the deficit reductions through cuts in public investment since those 
cuts may bring about severe negative impact on private capital accumulation and 
growth. 
Despite the existence of crowding-in effect by public investment for developed 
countries in Argimon, Gonzales and Roldan (1997) and in another work, Devarajan, 
Swaroop and Zou (1996) find reverse existence for developing countries. They develop 
a model to examine the link between components of government expenditure and 
economic growth. Using the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) and International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) annual data on 43 developing countries for the period of 1970 
to 1990, they test if different productive and nonproductive shares of government 
expenditure are associated with higher growth. The some components of productive 
expenditures; capital, transport and communication, health and education are found 
either insignificant or negative in their relation to growth. The current expenditure has, 
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however, positive and significant relation with growth. One way of interpreting this 
result, as they do, is that seemingly productive expenditures may be unproductive, for 
instance, due to their excessive shares in total government expenditure. From this 
evidence, they suggest, as opposed to Argimon, Gonzales and Roldan (1997), that 
governments may need to reconsider the shares of expenditures since several 
components of current expenditure, such as operations and maintenance, may have 
higher returns than public investment.    
Bairam and Ward (1993) use an aggregate investment function for 25 OECD countries 
over the period of 1950-1988. The annual data, which comes from Summers and Heston 
(1991), following Box-Cox specification, measures the elasticities of private investment 
with respect to government expenditure (eg), income (ey) and prices (ep) for each 
country. Among 20 developed and developing countries, 19 eg values are statistically 
significant and ranges from 0.54 to 1.66. The result implies that an increase in 
government expenditure lowers the investment in 19 of 20 countries significantly. 
Whereas Bairam and Ward (1993) indicate a significant crowding-out of private 
investment by aggregate government spending, Ahmed and Miller (2000) reveal some 
opposite results with disaggregated data. They search the effects of tax-financed and 
debt financed government expenditures on private investment for developed and 
developing countries.  
Their data covers the period of 1975 to1984 for 39 countries. Using the data from Miller 
and Russek (1997) with OLS, fixed and random-effect models, they report only fixed-
effect model results since it gives the best F test results among others. In their work, all 
variables are as shares of GDP. Ahmed and Miller find that debt-financed aggregate 
government expenditure (gd) has no significant effect on investment (inv) for the full 
sample; it has positive effect on inv in developing countries and negative effect in 
developed countries. As for the tax-financed aggregate government expenditure (gt), it 
has negative effects for full and sub-samples. Findings, in other words, imply that gd 
yields crowding-in for developing countries, crowding-out for developed countries 
whereas gt results in crowding-out for all three cases. Ahmed and Miller (2000) search 
also the effects of components of government expenditures (i.e. defense, education, 
health, social security and welfare, transportation and communication) and finally 
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conclude that tax-financed government expenditure crowds out more investment than 
debt-financed expenditure. 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) present the empirical evidence of some macroeconomic 
variables that may affect economic growth. In cross-sectional analysis, using the IFS 
data of 1950-1977 for 47 countries, the share of government spending, which excludes 
transfer payments and government fixed capital formation, has a coefficient of 0.024 
(s.e. = 0.14). It depicts that mean growth of the ratio of government spending to output 
has positive but insignificant effect on the output growth. Therefore this study does not 
confirm the pure neoclassical hypothesis, as some other papers do not either, that 
increase in government spending, or reduction efficient resource allocation, bears a 
lower level of output.  
Finally, yet it is not end of the literature of course, in comparison with the Kormendi 
and Meguire (1985), Blanchard and Perotti (1999) show a reverse result in a dynamic 
context.  They analyze the dynamic effects of shocks in government spending and taxes 
on output by a structural VAR system for the USA data, which comes from Quarterly 
National Income and Product Accounts and Quarterly Treasury Bulletin, for the period 
of 1960:1 1997:4. Where the variables are shares of GDP, the increase in tax has a 
negative effect on output, whereas the spending shocks have positive effects on output 
and are longer lasting than tax shocks. 
III. Empirical analysis 
In this part of study, I analyze the short-run and long-run dynamics of fiscal policy for 
the Turkish Economy. The purpose is to process several time series analysis to disclose 
if government actions by its expenditure components pressure private sector movements 
in the markets.  
The variables chosen to be employed in analysis are private gross fixed capital 
formation, from now on private investment (PINV), government gross fixed capital 
formation, from now on government investment (GINV), private final consumption 
(PC), government current expenditures, which include wages, salaries and other current 
expenditures (GC) and total taxes (TAX), respectively. All variables are real with 1987 
prices. The quarterly data covers the period of 1988:1 2003:1. The data is obtained 
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from The Central Bank of Turkey. By using the data, I aim at obtaining the long run and 
short run parameters of private investment and other variables if there exists a long run 
relationship among them. Given the foregoing framework, cointegration, vector error 
correction tests and impulse-response analysis are applied to variables. By investigating 
the test results and innovation accounts, it would be possible to reveal whether 
government expenditures crowd out private investment or not. 
In econometrical analysis, it is a basic necessity that either series are stationary or they 
are cointegrated. In the case of nonstationarity, one would get spurious results from the 
regression equations. Therefore, either researcher ought to use stationary variables in 
levels or differences or he/she uses cointegrated non-stationary variables in their levels. 
Although the variables of interest might be individually nonstationary, I(1), as many 
macro variables do, one or more linear combinations of those might be stationary, I(0). 
In presence of such linear combination(s), the variables are said to be cointegrated and 
therefore there exists a long-run relationship (equilibrium) among them (Granger, 
1991). In literature, it is underlined that prerequisite for cointegration is to obtain I(1) 
variables. Then, either naturally or due to this prerequisite, almost all cointegration 
applications refer to the I(1) series,  hence a cointegration relation is denoted as CI(1,1). 
Before proceeding the analysis, it should be noted that the set of I(2) variables, on the 
other hand, might be candidates of cointegration relationship of order CI(2,1), so that 
there exist a linear combination that is I(1) (Enders, 1995:359-361; J rgansen et al., 
1996).  
Dickey Fuller/Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test results of the natural log of 
variables are given in Table 1. All variables are found I(1) in their levels and I(0) in 
their differences, hence they are difference stationary. The next step is to search if any 
linear combination(s) of them is stationary. I established two standard VAR systems. 
The first system, VAR(I), includes the endogenous variables of LPINV, LGINV, LTAX 
and LGC. The second system, VAR(II), consists of LPINV, LGINV, LGC and LPC. In 
both systems, to capture the seasonal effects in data, a centered seasonal dummy (DS) is 
employed. Besides, to catch up the possible effects of financial crises; 5 April of 1994 
and 22 February of 2001 in the data, two pulse dummies, D94 and D01, are used. In 
determining the lag numbers of the VAR systems, considering over-parameterization, 
the maximum lag number is chosen as 6. In lag order selection, Schwarz information 
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criteria (SC), likelihood ratio (LR), final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information 
criteria (AIC) and Hannan-Quinn criteria (HQ) are used, together with the main concern 
of choosing the relatively smaller lag. In testing the Johansen s deterministic trend 
assumptions, the SC and AIC are observed.    
III.1 Private investment behavior in VAR(I) 
In VAR (I), the lag length is chosen as 2 by SC. It is found as 5 by LR, FPE, AIC and 
HQ. I preferred SC to avoid over-parameterization problem. Some evidence from 
Monte Carlo studies also shows that SC dominates all other criteria named above in 
VAR process (Köse and Uçar, 1994). In the system, dummies of DS, D4 and D01 are 
found significant by LR test at 1%, 5% and 5%, critical values, respectively. After 
determining the optimal lag length, one needs to test the deterministic trend 
assumptions. By SC criteria, it is found that the series in VAR have linear trends but the 
cointegrating equations (CE) have only intercepts. Table 2A gives the result of one rank 
by both trace and max-eigenvalue statistics at both 5% and 1% levels.  
       Table 1. Unit Root Test in Levels and Differences   
DF/ADF Lag Q Stat (a) p(Q) 
LPINV 
1 0.305 5 17.802 (13) 0.165 
2 -2.264 4 22.045 (14) 0.078  
3 -1.990 4 20.381 (14) 0.119 
LGINV 
1 -0.474 4 11.822 (14) 0.621 
2 -2.063 4 12.131 (14) 0.596  
3 -2.063 4 12.518 (14) 0.565 
LTAX 
1 5.928 7 18.851 (13) 0.128 
2 -0.019 7 18.343 (13) 0.145  
3 -1.660 7 20.543 (13) 0.082 
LGC 
1 2.192 4 21.166 (14) 0.097 
2 -0.965 4 21.428 (14) 0.091  
3 -2.428 4 21.431 (14) 0.091 
LPC 
1 1.508 4 21.619 (14) 0.087 
2 -2.287 4 22.265 (14) 0.073  
3 -2.865 4 17.734 (14) 0.219 
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Table 1. Unit Root Test in Levels and Differences (continued)   
DF/ADF Lag Q Stat (a) p(Q) 
DLPINV  
1 -3.517 4 20.278 (14) 0.122 
2 -3.501b 4 20.255 (14) 0.122  
3 -5.292 5 12.863 (14) 0.537 
DLGINV 
1 -4.259 3 11.859 (14) 0.618 
2 -4.197 3 11.827 (14) 0.620  
3 -4.158 3 11.984 (14) 0.608 
DLTAX 
1 -1.292c 8 18.674 (13) 0.134 
2 -8.478 6 18.378 (13) 0.144  
3 -8.385 6 18.679 (13) 0.133 
DLGC 
1 -3.669 3 23.372 (14) 0.054 
2 -4.405 3 21.251 (14) 0.095  
3 -4.400 3 21.750 (14) 0.084 
DLPC 
1 -2.840 3 22.088 (14) 0.077 
2 -3.245 3 21.670 (14) 0.086  
3 -5.886 6 13.055 (13) 0.444 
1: no constant, no trend 
2: constant, no trend 
3: constant and trend 
a: Number of lags in correlogram for residuals 
b: DLPINV  2 is significant at %5. 
c: DLTAX   1 is not significant %1 and %5. 
All others are found significant at both %5 and %1 critical values.  
Table 2.a Trend Assumption: Linear Deterministic Trend
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None   0.873383  135.2913  47.21  54.46 
At most 1  0.151700  13.36240  29.68  35.65 
At most 2  0.060047  3.655671  15.41  20.04 
At most 3  3.48E-05  0.002055   3.76   6.65       
Trace test indicates 1 CE at both 5% and 1% levels 
         
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None   0.873383  121.9289  27.07  32.24 
At most 1  0.151700  9.706725  20.97  25.52 
At most 2  0.060047  3.653616  14.07  18.63 
At most 3  3.48E-05  0.002055   3.76   6.65       
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 CE at both 5% and 1% levels 
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Normalized cointegrating coefficient (std.err. in parentheses) 
LPINV LGINV LGC LTAX  
1.000000  1.324391 -14.56826  6.620327    
(0.36342)  (1.03260)  (0.45244)       
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LPINV) D(LGINV) D(LGC) D(LTAX)  
-0.072297 -0.009015  0.058047 -0.093553   
(0.00969)  (0.02103)  (0.00483)  (0.00657)       
Table 2.b Significance Tests of the Adjustment and Cointegrating Coefficients 
D(LPINV) 2(1)=43.572 (0.000) LPINV 2(1)=8.730 (0.000) 
D(LGINV) 2(1)=0.2114 (0.645) LGINV 2(1)=11.500 (0.000) 
D(LGC) 2(1)=77.592 (0.000) LGC 2(1)=84.718 (0.000) 
D(LTAX) 2(1)=94.742 (0.000) LTAX 2(1)=90.421 (0.000) 
The standard errors from Table 2.a indicate that all estimated coefficients, except the 
adjustment coefficient of D(LGINV), are statistically significant. One can check the 
significance of the coefficients by LR test also. LR test results shown in Table 2.b 
confirm the result of Table 2.a. The single cointegrating equilibrium, or long-run 
equilibrium of LGINV, LGC and LTAX with respect to LPINV, is given by Eq.(1) . 
LPINV = -1.324 LGINV + 14.568 LGC - 6.620 LTAX (1) 
The private investment in Turkey is positively affected by government current 
expenditures but negatively affected by both government investment and taxes imposed 
by government in the long run. The adjustment coefficients imply the short-run 
dynamics. They show the speed of adjustments of the variables in response to a standard 
deviation from long-run equilibrium. LPINV changes, for instance, in response to the 
one unit deviation from long-run equilibrium by -0.072297 units. In order for the system 
to return to the long-run equilibrium, the movements of at least some of the variables 
must respond to the magnitude of the disequilibrium. If all adjustment coefficients were 
equal to zero, there would be no long-run relation and no error correction. Therefore, at 
least one of them should be statistically different from zero (Enders, 1995:365-366).  
By exclusion the adjustment parameter of D(LGINV) with the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients (LPINV =1), one obtains a new vector error correction model (VECM) 
together with the new cointegrating vector and adjustment parameters. Eq(2) gives the 
normalized cointegrating vector, which represents long-run equilibrium of LPINV with 
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government s fiscal components. Eq. (3) represents the short-run dynamics of LPINV, 
which is the first equation of VECM. 
LPINV = -1,299 LGINV + 14.584 LGC - 6.626 LTAX (2) 
D(LPINV) =  - 0.0723 LPINV(-1) + 1.2995 LGINV(-1) -14.5841 LGC(-1)   
                                     + 6.6261 LTAX(-1) +  27.4472
 
                        + 0.0273 D(LPINV(-1)) + 0.0478 D(LGINV(-1)) - 0.3860 D(LGC(-1))  
                        + 0.1553 D(LTAX(-1)) + 0.0071  
                        + 0.1446 DS - 0.2001 D94 - 0.2021 D01 (3)   
As the adjustment coefficient of D(LGINV) is restricted to zero, LPINV, LGINV, LGC 
and LTAX are again individually found statistically significant in Eq.(2) at 5%, 1%, 1% 
and 1% critical values respectively . The adjustment coefficients of D(LPINV), D(LGC) 
and D(LTAX) are again significant  at 5%, 1% and 1% respectively.  Lag exclusion test 
also indicates that the first differenced lags of all endogenous variables are jointly 
significant in the model with the p value of 0.000. The signs of all cointegration and 
adjustment coefficients are the same as those found before at Table 2.a. With slight 
differences in coefficient values, the short-run and long-run implications did not change 
under the exclusion. Finally diagnostic tests are carried out for VECM. Table 3 
indicates that the model does not suffer from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and 
normality assumption is not rejected.  
Table 3. Diagnostic Tests of Residuals 
Ho: No serial correlation 2(15)=16.252 (0.435)
Ho: Residuals are  
multivariate normal  2(55)=72.39  (0.057)
Ho: No ARCH without c.t.   
(levels and squares) 2(130)=116.5 (0.794)
Ho: No ARCH with c.t. 2(280)=288.1 (0.356)
In short, all coefficients of VECM are found significant and the model performs well. 
At this point, one can make inferences about Eqs. (2) and (3). The statement of Eq. (2) 
is that government fixed investment and taxes crowd out private fixed investment, as 
government current consumption crowd in private investment in the long run. Eq. (3) 
gives the short-run adjustment of LPINV to deviation from lung run. On the right-hand 
side of Eq. (3), the first and second line in brackets gives the estimate of deviation from 
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long-run equilibrium in period (t-1). With respect to investment relation, this 
discrepancy disappears by -0.0723 units each quarter. 
Before analyzing VAR(II), despite their lag selection disadvantage relatively to SC, one 
might wonder the case of LR, FPE, AIC and HQ s selection in VAR(I). By these 
criteria, the lag length is chosen as 5. In testing the deterministic trend assumptions, 
AIC determined that both series and CE have linear trends. By conducting these 
application, dummies are found significant and rank is determined as 1 by both trace 
and max statistics. Following the model, in the long run equation, all cointegration and 
adjustment parameters are found statistically significant except LGINV. The LPINV is 
affected positively by LGC and negatively by LTAX, as it is not affected significantly 
by LGINV in the long run (not reported).   
III.2 Private investment behavior in VAR (II) 
In VAR (II), I substituted LPC for LTAX. In this system, one would expect that private 
final consumption have positive relation with private investment. By employing 
LPINV, LGINV, LPC and LGC in VAR(II), all lag selection criteria used here; SC, LR, 
FPE, AIC and HQ select the lag order of 4.  The both SC and AIC are in favor the 
model of linear trends in both series and CE. In the system, dummies of DS and D4 are 
found significant by LR test at 1% critical values, but the null of D01 could not be 
rejected with the 2(4) = 0.909 and the corresponding p value of 0.923. Exclusion D01 
did not change the lag number and the hypothesis test result about trend. Table 4A gives 
the result of single cointegration equation at 5% level by both trace and max statistics.  
Table 4.a Trend Assumption: Linear Deterministic Trend        
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value  
None *  0.426573  64.37805  62.99  70.05  
At most 1  0.279575  32.67890  42.44  48.45  
At most 2  0.169526  13.98781  25.32  30.45  
At most 3  0.057898  3.399572  12.25  16.26         
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 1% level       
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Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value  
None *  0.426573  31.69915  31.46  36.65  
At most 1  0.279575  18.69109  25.54  30.34  
At most 2  0.169526  10.58824  18.96  23.65  
At most 3  0.057898  3.399572  12.25  16.26         
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 1% level       
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
LPINV LGINV LGC LPC @TREND(88:2)
1.000000  0.678059 -1.806425 -3.485462  0.038441    
(0.06672)  (0.41621)  (0.20676)  (0.00376)        
Adjustment coefficients (std.err. in parentheses) 
D(LPINV) D(LGINV) D(LGC) D(LPC)   
-0.492940 -1.402534  0.029141  0.092391    
(0.28314)  (0.40518)  (0.12616)  (0.11354)         
Table 4.b Significance Tests of the Adjustment and Cointegrating Coefficients
D(LPINV) 2(1)=2.034 (0.153) LPINV 2(1)=12.958 (0.000) 
D(LGINV) 2(1)=11.800 (0.000) LGINV 2(1)=12.905 (0.000) 
D(LGC) 2(1)=0.052 (0.818) LGC 2(1)=8.852 (0.002) 
D(LPC) 2(1)=0.493 (0.482) LPC 2(1)=12.986 (0.000) 
Upon significance results from Table 4.a and Table 4.b, I first excluded the adjustment 
parameters of D(LGC) and D(LPC). Then D(LPINV) becomes significant with the t 
value of 3.13. LR tests also validates this result as is seen at Table 4.c  
Table 4.c Significance Tests of the Coefficients 
                  with the Restriction D(LGC)=0,  D(LPC)=0 
D(LPINV) 2(3)=10.543 (0.014) LPINV 2(3)=24.989 (0.000) 
D(LGINV) 2(3)=12.842 (0.004) LGINV 2(3)=24.127 (0.000) 
D(LGC) =0 LGC 2(3)=13.218 (0.004) 
D(LPC) =0 LPC 2(3)=21.226 (0.000) 
With the restriction D(LGC)=0, D(LPC)=0 and the normalized cointegrating 
coefficients (LPINV =1), all coefficients are significant and exclusion test indicate that 
first, second and third differenced lags of endogenous variables are jointly significant. 
The long-run equilibrium and short-run adjustment equilibrium of LPINV are given 
below by Eqs. (4) and (5) respectively. Eq. (5) is D(LPINV) part of the VECM. 
Diagnostic check of the VECM is reported at Table 5.  
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LPINV = -0.683 LGINV + 1.651 LGC + 3.476 LPC (4) 
D(LPINV) =  - 0.6736  LPINV(-1) + 0.6833 LGINV(-1) - 1.6514 LGC(-1) - 3.4768 LPC(-1)   
                      + 0.0368 TREND + 31.636    
                       + 0.3721 D(LPINV(-1)) - 0.0001 D(LPINV(-2)) + 0.1593 D(LPINV(-3))  
                       + 0.2113 D(LGINV(-1)) + 0.2375 D(LGINV(-2)) + 0.0019 D(LGINV(-3))  
-  0.5628 D(LGC(-1)) - 0.2217 D(LGC(-2)) + 0.6023 D(LGC(-3))  
-  1.2823 D(LPC(-1)) - 0.6436 D(LPC(-2)) - 0.5776 D(LPC(-3))  
+ 0.0261 - 0.2742 DS - 0.1411 D94 (5) 
Table 5. Diagnostic Tests of Residuals 
Ho: No serial correlation 2(14)=18.502 (0.295) 
Ho: Residuals are  
multivariate normal   2(55)=59.357  (0.319) 
Ho: No ARCH without c.t. 
(levels and dquares)  2(280)=296.30 (0.240) 
Ho: No ARCH with c.t. na na 
Table 5 indicates that the residuals obtained from VECM are not serially correlated, 
normally distributed with no heteroskedasticity. With the conclusion that all coefficients 
are significant and model is adequate, one can interpret the Eqs. (4) and (5) in confident. 
In the long run, private investment decreases due to increase in government investment. 
Government consumption and private consumption, on the other hand, are positively 
associated with private investment. This finding confirms the long-run relation of 
private investment given by Eq. 2 in VAR (I).  In the short run, private investment 
changes in response to the one unit deviation from long run equilibrium by 0.6736 
units. In other words, the deviation value between actual LPINV (short run) and long-
run LPINV is corrected by -0.6736 units each period. 
III.3 Impulse-response analysis 
Impulse response functions expose the dynamic response of each endogenous variable 
to a shock in the other variables. This dynamic tracing enables us to observe the effect 
of a unit shock in one variable on current and future values of itself and another 
variable(s). Hence all variables in VAR system are all affected through one standard 
deviation shock occurred in innovations of any variable in the system. In impulse-
response analysis, ordering the variables in VAR system is important and analysis is 
subject to change under different ordering, if one works with Choleski factorization. 
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Then one should make decision on which variable behaves more exogenously, then that 
variable can come first (Doan, 1992: 8.14). I, however, use the generalized impulse 
responses that appear recently in the literature since this method does not impose a 
priori restrictions to the ordering of the variables (Pesaran and Shin, 1998; Ewing, 
2003).  
Figure 1 exhibits the responses of LPINV to the impulses of all individual variables in 
the VAR(I) system. From up to down, first line shows the response of LGINV to its 
own shock. Second line reveals the impact of LGC on LPINV. With the impulse, 
LPINV increases sharply for two quarters, increases steadily till the third quarter, 
declines at the fourth quarter then keep its relatively higher level for the following 
quarters. The third line exhibits almost negligible effect of LGINV. This exhibition 
brings about some doubts about the negative long-run effect of government investment 
on private investment. Finally the fourth line shows negative effect of LTAX on 
LPINV. Upon a unit shock of LTAX, LPINV moves down for three quarters. Although 
LPINV increases for one period, this negative impact on LPINV does not die out in the 
long run.  
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses in VAR(II) system. From up to down, first line 
exhibits the response of LPINV to the LPINV equation. Second and third lines give the 
positive impacts of LPC and LGC, respectively. LPC has relatively stronger positive 
effect on LPINV compared to LGC. Due to these shocks in LPC and LGC equations, 
LPINV goes up quickly in the short term and keeps its relatively higher level for the 
long term. As for the fourth line, it depicts the effect of LGINV on LPINV. Looking at 
the responses, we observe that a positive LGINV innovation at initial time has a lasting 
effect on LPINV. Upon a shock, in the short-term, LPINV decreases sharply for two 
quarters, then slightly increases till the third quarter, then again starts declining for four 
quarters. This negative effect of LGINV on LPINV stands for longer periods. This 
effect does not disappear till the 20th quarter, hence might be called permanent negative 
effect.     
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Figure 2. Response of LPINV to Generalized One
S.D. Innovations in VAR(II)
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IV. Conclusion 
The preceding sections shortly exposed the basic literature of crowding-out/in debate 
and conducted time series analysis on this issue. Depending upon their core 
assumptions, pure neoclassical model, the Keynesian model and neoclassical synthesis 
created a huge controversy for many decades in this area of debate. Empirical analysis, 
however, are still far from ending in these disputes of macroeconomics. Furthermore, 
combining also the classical and or Marxists theories, in their more sophisticated 
structural perspectives, into these juxtaposing analyses of macro dynamics, one would 
see macroeconomics going far below the consensus. The consensus is required? This is 
another question. The study adds one more statistical search into available ones, in 
which recent time series analyses, that are mostly absent from the studies presented, are 
carried out. 
Working on two different VAR systems and related cointegration and VECM models 
reveal a crowding out effect of government investment and crowding in effect of 
government current consumption in the long run. This result is confirmed by impulse 
response analysis, except the seemingly insignificant effect of government investment 
on private investment in VAR(I). This might be due to the investment relation equation 
set up in VAR(I). The second VAR system establishes a more identified investment 
equation in which investment is a function of aggregate expenditures rather than just 
government fiscal components. With this regard, one may keep the result that 
government investments crowd out whereas its current expenditures crowd in. This may 
suggest that government may reconsider its current consumption in its guidance toward 
macro goals. The concluding result may also propose government to eliminate the size 
of the potential unproductive investments.         
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